Northern Illinois University Law Review
Volume 28

Issue 3

Article 8

7-1-2008

Vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 2008: Table of Contents
Northern Illinois University Law Review

Follow this and additional works at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Northern Illinois University Law Review (2008) "Vol. 28, no. 3, Summer 2008: Table of Contents," Northern
Illinois University Law Review: Vol. 28: Iss. 3, Article 8.
Available at: https://huskiecommons.lib.niu.edu/niulr/vol28/iss3/8

This Other/Newsletter is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Law at Huskie Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Northern Illinois University Law Review by an authorized editor of Huskie Commons.
For more information, please contact jschumacher@niu.edu.

Northern Illinois University
Volume 28

Law Review
Summer 2008

Number 3

SYMPosIuM: THE MODERN AMERICAN JURY
ARTICLES

Judicial Nullification? Judicial Compliance and Non-Compliance with
Jury Improvement Efforts
Paula L. Hannaford-Agor ................................................
407
Many jury trial procedures and practices are left to "the sound
discretion of the trial court." This discretion provides judges with
flexibility to meet the individual needs of each trial. Using information from the State-of-the-States Survey of Jury Improvement Efforts,
this article documents the extent to which trial judges exercise that
discretion with respect to trialprocedures and practicesdesigned to
improve jury comprehension, performance, and satisfaction. It
describes legal, cultural, and case-specificfactors that contribute to
jurisdictionalvariation in the use of these procedures and practices,
including judicial non-compliance with prohibited and mandatory
practices. Finally, it discusses whether judicial non-compliance with
proceduralprohibitionsand mandates amounts to a form of judicial
nullification and, if so, whether it serves the same purpose as jury
nullification (e.g., as a check on judicial, executive, and legislative
excesses).

Jury Nullification: An Empirical Perspective
Irw in A . H orow itz ........................................................

Prominent jurists have suggested that it may be permissible to
inform juries of their power to decide verdicts according to their
conscience, regardless of the law. Juries may be informed of their
power, known as jury nullification, to nullify the law either by
carefully crafted instructions from the judge or by permitting the
defense counsel to make a nullification argument during closing
statements. This article exams these proposals in light of the latest
empirical research on these issues. This article also presents a short
history of jury nullification and its current status in the U.S. legal
system. Current research suggests that the original notion expressed
in U.S. v. Dougherty that nullification instructions would have a
chaotic effect, appears to have some empirical support. Chaos
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means that jury verdicts may be unpredictable, determined by
personal prejudices and possibly vindictive. Earlier work suggested
that juries in receipt of nullification instructions will be more merciful to a morally worthy defendant than when not given such instructions. It is important to note that the bulk of the research still shows
that jurors do use information about their power to nullify in a
circumscribed and careful manner. However, more recent research,
which directly manipulated emotionally biasing information, as
opposed to factually biasing information, suggests juror verdicts
may be considered to be "chaotic."

In the Vanguard of the American Jury: A Case Study of Jury
Innovations in the Northern District of Iowa
K irk W . Schuler .......................................................... 453
Since taking the oath of office nearlyfifteen years ago, United States
District Court Judge Mark Bennett has made it a priority to champion the American jury. While jurors are typically less than thrilled
to be summoned for service, Judge Bennett makes sure their "day in
court" is memorable and rewarding. This article discusses how
Judge Bennett does it: from creating the "evidence corridor" to
debriefing the jury post-verdict. Some techniques are simple, some
complex, but most all are innovations. Moreover, with at least 300
jury trials under his belt, Judge Bennett's techniques are battle
tested and proven, and ripe for a discussion in this case study of the
Modern American Jury in the Northern Districtof Iowa.

People v. Coughlin and Criticisms of the Criminal Jury in Late
Nineteenth-Century Chicago
E lizabeth D ale ................................................................. 503
The last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of
the twentieth century are often described as the era in which the
criminal jury trial came to an end. Criminal juries did not completely disappear,of course, but their role became smaller in those
decades. Studies of the phenomenon typically attribute that decline
to the rise of plea bargainsin that same period. These studies note
that institutionalfactors, such as case loads and the political pressure on elected prosecutors to be "tough on crime," made plea
bargains an increasingly attractive option for the State, and conclude from this that the rise of plea bargains caused the decline of
criminaljuries. In this article I argue that this explanation does not
fit the case of late nineteenth-, early twentieth-century Chicago. In
that period the felony courts in Chicago, like felony courts in Los
Angeles, Philadelphia,and Boston, did make increasing use of plea
bargainsand jury trials declined, as well. But the data suggest that
the greater use of pleas did not lead to the decline of criminaljuries,
so much as resultfrom efforts to avoid jury trials. To consider why
that might be so, this article explores the contemporary views of
criminal juries by unpacking a trial from late nineteenth-century
Chicago, People v. Coughlin.

The Federalization of Punitive Damages and the Effect on Illinois Law
Frank A. Perrecone and Lisa R. Fabiano ................................. 537
Punitive damages have traditionally been a matter of state law, left
to state courts and legislatures to review and regulate. But in the
midst of the tort reform movement of the 1990s, the United States
Supreme Court took sides in the policy debate, fashioning a novel
substantive due process right limiting punitive damage awards and
suppressing the power of juries to punish and deter egregious
conduct. This article traces the evolution of the federalization of
punitive damages based on questionable authority, criticizes the
Supreme Court's intrusion into an area of state law, demonstrates
how Supreme Court precedent has been misapplied by lower courts,
and suggests a methodology for practitionersto withstand a constitutional due process challenge to the size of a punitive damage
award.
COMMENT

SLAPPed in Illinois: The Scope and Applicability of the Illinois Citizen
Participation Act
M ark J. Sobczak ...........................................................

This article examines the origins, structure, and consequent effectiveness of the recently enacted Illinois Citizen ParticipationAct.
Designed to combat a particularbreed of vexatious litigation known
as "Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation,"or "SLAPPs,"
the Citizen ParticipationAct conditionally immunizes potential civil
defendants from liability when they are sued for acts implicating
their FirstAmendment rights. The article briefly examines the nature
of SLAPPs, why they stand contrary to public policy, and outlines
some proposed solutions to eliminate or reduce their use. The article
then explores the substantive and procedural mechanisms employed
by Illinois to bring about the objectives behind the new law. After
comparing the Citizen ParticipationAct to similar laws passed in
other states, it becomes apparent that the broad language and
applicability of the Act, coupled with its one-sided remedial mechanisms, presents a significant risk of destabilizing the fine balance of
adversarialrights held by civil plaintiffs and defendants in Illinoisa balance the Act, on its face, seeks to protect. Finally, the article
offers two relatively simple solutions that, if enacted, would help
ensure the Citizen ParticipationAct successfully attains its goal of
creatinga more equitable and democratic judicialprocessfor all.
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NOTE

Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc.: The Final Blow to
the use of Per Se Rules in Judging Vertical Restraints - Why the Court
Got it Wrong
Christopher S. Kelly ..........................................................
593
This case note provides an in depth discussion of Leegin Creative
Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., in which the United States
Supreme Court held that minimum resale price maintenance should
be analyzed under the rule of reason, and thus striking down the
century-old per se rule against vertical price fixing. After providing
a brief overview of antitrust law, with a particular emphasis on
Supreme Court vertical restraintjurisprudence, an in depth discussion of both the majority and dissenting Leegin opinions is provided.
Next, the note argues that the Court erred in striking down the per se
rule by finding that the use of vertical minimum price restraints is
not "always or almost always" anticompetitive. Specifically, it will
be asserted that the Court erred by failing to examine any empirical
data in support of its economic assumptions, discounting the importance of intramarket competition as a check on the market, by not
considering if procompetitive uses of vertical minimum price restraints are even practical or likely to be implemented, and by
lending no credence to stare decisis considerations.Finally, the note
will consider the anticipated impact of the decision on both the
market and antitrust enforcement, and will discuss the possible
congressional response it may have triggered.

